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AbsTrACT
The Second World War lent impetus to the creation 
of new models and explanatory frameworks of risk, 
encouraging a closer reading of the relationship between 
individual psychiatric disorder and social disarray. This 
article interrogates how conceptions of psychiatric risk 
were animated in debates around abortion reform to 
forge new connections between social conditions and 
psychiatric vulnerability in post-war Britain. Drawing 
upon the arguments that played out between medical 
practitioners, I suggest that abortion reform, culminating 
in the 1967 Abortion Act, was both a response to and 
a stimulus for new ideas about the interaction between 
social aetiologies and medical pathologies; indeed, it 
became a site in which the medical and social domains 
were recognised as mutually constitutive. Positioned in a 
landscape in which medical professionals were seeking 
to assert their authority and to defend their areas of 
practice, abortion reform offered new opportunities for 
medical professionals to intervene in the social sphere 
under the guise of risk to women’s mental health. The 
debate in medical journals around the status of issues 
that were seen to bridge the social and the medical 
were entangled with increasing anxiety about patient 
agency and responsibility. These concerns were further 
underscored as conversations about psychiatric risk 
extended towards considerations of the potential 
impact on women’s existing families, bringing domestic 
conditions and the perceived psychosocial importance 
of family life into relief within medical journals. This 
article, then, argues that conceptions of psychiatric 
risk, as refracted through the creation of new synapses 
connecting the social and the medical domains, were 
critical to medical debates over abortion reform in post-
war Britain.
InTroduCTIon
Four years before the Abortion Act 1967, psychi-
atrist Myre Sim declared in the British Medical 
Journal (BMJ) that ‘there are no psychiatric grounds 
for the termination of pregnancy’, for abortion was 
a socioeconomic problem, with the psychiatrist 
merely providing a means to circumvent restric-
tive legislation.1 Sim was quickly rebuked: another 
psychiatrist, Roger Tredgold, pointed to the legal 
consensus that ‘psychiatric grounds do exist’.2 The 
psychiatrist, Tredgold claimed, could only assess the 
likelihood of mental disorder based on individual 
circumstance, and socioeconomic factors were 
often too integral to this to ignore.3 Underlying the 
controversy was the question of the extent to which 
ostensibly social factors affected mental well-being 
and how the risk to mental health could be impli-
cated in medical decisions.
The Abortion Act 1967, as originally enacted, 
decreed that abortion was lawful if two registered 
medical practitioners agreed that ‘the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of 
the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman, or any existing 
children of her family…In determining whether the 
continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk 
of injury to health…account may be taken of the 
pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable 
environment’.4 Thus, the Abortion Act 1967 asserted 
risk as a critical metric in the decision-making process 
in abortion cases. Within the medical and legal land-
scape, ‘mental health’ became a means of acknowl-
edging the environmental and social strains of 
unwanted childbearing. The Act therefore embodied 
a new understanding of the intersections and overlap-
ping interests of social and medical reproductive care.
By 1970, three-quarters of all legal abortions in 
England and Wales were performed on psychiatric 
grounds, although one physician observed in a letter 
to The Lancet that ‘these grounds are usually those 
of psychological reaction to the environmental 
situation created by an unwanted pregnancy’.5 In 
a House of Lords debate in 1969, it was reported 
that 28 849 abortions were carried out under the 
Act in England and Wales between 27 April 1968 
and 25 February 1969. Of these, 20 746 were 
conducted due to ‘risk to physical or mental health 
of woman’.6 Clearly, the threat to mental health 
constituted a significant point of access to medical 
terminations.
This article explores how the medical commu-
nity navigated the relationship between social and 
environmental factors and medical categories in 
post-war Britain during debates about abortion 
reform. I argue that risk was a critical lexicon in 
the abortion debates of the 1960s. Put another 
way, I suggest that it was under the auspices of 
risk to women’s mental health that concerns about 
the personal implications and social contexts of 
unwanted pregnancies were made legitimate within 
the medical domain. Drawing on medical literature 
and legislative debates from the 1960s, this article 
is a contribution to the literature on the history of 
abortion reform in Britain. It is also in dialogue 
with scholarship that charts the emergence of risk 
as a concept that traversed social, legal and medical 
domains in the post-war period.
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AborTIon And rIsk
This article, therefore, is in conversation with multidisciplinary 
scholarship that has recently emerged around the mechanisms 
and processes through which abortion was medicalised. Fran 
Amery, for example, has argued that the medicalisation of abor-
tion was an ‘incomplete and fragmentary process’, engaging the 
state and the medical profession in a complex discussion about 
medical responsibility and sociomedicine.7 As Amery notes, the 
extension of the concepts of health and medicine through abor-
tion debates was not welcomed ubiquitously; rather, they were 
‘fraught with difficulty’ and ‘caused rifts between Parliament and 
the medical profession’.8 The medical profession, as Sheelagh 
McGuinness and Michael Thomson have shown, was also riven 
with internal disputes: they identify the relationship between 
the Royal Colleges as particularly important to the trajectory of 
abortion services.9 Abortion, McGuinness and Thomson argue, 
is ‘one boundary issue among many that helped to define medi-
cine and, in so doing, the content of proper medical practice’.10 
Risk, I contend, was one way that this professional boundary was 
defined. This article, then, addresses the history of the regulation 
of abortion and how this was shaped by the importance granted 
to the metric of risk. It demonstrates the way that medical risk 
became embedded in legislation and was articulated in and 
through debates about an issue that operated at the boundary of 
the social and the medical. Significantly, the relationship between 
legislation and medical expertise remains contested. As Ellie Lee 
has shown, the purported threats to women’s mental health 
posed by abortion continue to be deployed by those seeking to 
curtail women’s access to the reproductive procedure.11 The 
discourse of risk continues to be mobilised, too, by those seeking 
to liberalise abortion. Indeed, recent calls for abortion legislation 
to be liberalised have been made on the grounds that ‘legislation 
has to match the science’, arguing that the legislation should be 
brought ‘in line with modern medicine and legislation’.12 Argu-
ments about medical abortion—in which two pills are taken—are 
now put forward in terms of the relative safety of this method, 
and the risks posed by forcing women to be administered these 
pills in a clinical setting, away from the potential comforts 
provided by their home, are brought to the fore.13 Changes to 
abortion legislation, then, remain framed within the discourse of 
risk. These discourses continue to challenge the clinical setting 
and appropriateness of the medical oversight of abortion.
The rise and origins of risk have been richly theorised, 
perhaps most notably by Ulrich Beck. Beck argued that as risks 
are dependent on choices, they are ‘politically reflexive’; that 
the sources of danger were not ‘ignorance but knowledge’.14 As 
this article demonstrates, the knowability of patients’ contexts 
was a critical issue in debates over abortion reform. As Robert 
Castel has pointed out, ‘new strategies dissolve the notion of a 
subject or a concrete individual, and put in its place a combi-
nation of factors, the factors of risk’.15 Put another way, a ‘risk 
does not arise from the presence of a particular danger embodied 
in a concrete individual or group. It is the effect of a combina-
tion of abstract factors which render more or less probable the 
occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour’.16 Risk attained 
a particular importance in post-war Britain: Nikolas Rose has 
argued that while public health has been attentive to risk as a 
metric since the 19th century, ‘risk thinking’ assumes a particular 
significance and character in societies dominated by pharmaceu-
tical modes of treatment.17 The global rise of pharmacological 
interventions in the post-war period has indeed been charted 
by historians.18 The late-20th century, Rose has concurred with 
Castel, oversaw a shift from the move from dangerousness to 
risk in psychiatric thinking.19 ‘The responsibilities of almost all 
psychiatric professionals have come to be redefined in terms of 
the assessment of risk’ Rose observes, and through the ‘gener-
alisation of the criterion of risk’ mental health professionals 
‘participate in the management of individuals’.20 In the case of 
abortion reform, of course, doctors oversaw the management of 
individual patients, and the criterion of risk was made official in 
legislation. Anthony Giddens observed that much contemporary 
politics is ‘now about managing risks—risks which do not origi-
nate in the political sphere, yet have to be politically managed’.21 
Abortion reform legislation, passed through parliament, formal-
ised medical management of the risk posed by unwanted preg-
nancies. Through the examination of the ways that risk was 
implicated in abortion reform, we can come to understand how 
psychiatric risk made the social visible in post-war Britain.
Ellie Lee has shown that the Abortion Act embodied contem-
porary understandings of a ‘set of interrelated social questions’ 
and that the medicalisation of abortion made the ‘assessment of 
the mental health of the woman… a significant feature of the 
operation of abortion law’. This, she suggests, allowed women 
access to legal abortion but inscribed their perceived mental 
vulnerability into law.22 I argue that the Act also articulated a 
connection between risk and mental health in post-war legis-
lation. I contend that the process of legislative change around 
abortion in the 1960s acted as what Richard Ericson and Aaron 
Doyle have termed a ‘system’ by which ‘risks are given meaning 
and acted on’.23 As Ericson and Doyle contend, ‘Risk is called 
into being, made visible, and responded to through the rules, 
formats, and technologies available… The communication system 
makes risks real’.24 Around abortion, psychiatric risk was ‘called 
into being’ by the medical profession’s various organisations 
and the legislative framework of the British state; the dialogue 
between medical bodies and Parliament created a ‘communica-
tion system’ and made risk a critical category of analysis in abor-
tion cases. These legislative and professional communication 
systems imbued psychiatric risk in abortion cases with meanings 
drawn from the perceived psychosocial significance of the family 
environment that were in circulation in the years preceding the 
passage of the Act.
WreCks And rIsks before The 1967 AborTIon ACT
Prior to the passage of the 1967 Abortion Act, the law governing 
abortion in England and Wales was principally drawn from 
sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
As Sally Sheldon has observed, the Act was ‘widely criticised as 
anachronistic and archaic’ and did not articulate any exceptions 
for therapeutic abortions or contain any time limits.25 Time limits 
were subsequently introduced by the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act 1929, although as Sheldon notes, this was introduced not to 
address abortion but rather to address the legal loophole around 
killing a child in the midst of being born. This Act proscribed the 
destruction of a child ‘capable of being born alive’ and decreed 
that this capacity began at 28 weeks’ gestation. Significantly, 
the Act also decreed that ‘no person shall be found guilty of an 
offence under this section unless it is proved that the act which 
caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the 
purpose only of preserving the life of the mother’.26 As Stephen 
Brooke has said, however, this definition of life did not explicitly 
allow for the consideration of economic, social or psychological 
indications.27 This did not mean, of course, that mental health 
indications were not taken into account in practice; indeed, John 
Keown has demonstrated that doctors defended an expansive 
definition of health in the 1920s.28 Nonetheless, by the late 
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1930s, there were varying opinions among doctors as to when 
abortion was permissible.29
The opportunity to challenge and clarify the law arose in 1938. 
Overseen by Mr Justice Macnaghten, the case of Rex v. Bourne 
concerned an abortion carried out by the gynaecologist Dr Aleck 
Bourne.30 His patient was a 14-year-old girl who had been raped 
by a group of soldiers; as a result of the termination, Bourne was 
charged under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.31 The 
case hinged on whether a distinction could be drawn between 
preserving health and saving life.32 Bourne’s defense was that he 
performed the termination due to the inter-relationship between 
‘danger to life and danger to health’ and that the girl’s mental 
health would be endangered by completing the pregnancy.33 
Bourne was found not guilty and the case set a precedent in 
allowing for a broader interpretation lawfulness of abortion 
under existing legislation.34
The judgement was not considered entirely satisfactory, 
however, Bourne’s acquittal was rued in The Lancet as having 
‘left the legal position—except for two welcome passages in the 
judge’s summing-up…only a little less obscure than before’.35 
Justice Macnaghten digressed ‘from purely physical indications 
in order to give support to the view that termination is also 
lawful in those cases where the mental health of the mother is 
seriously threatened’.36
Discussion focused on Macnaghten’s use of non-medical 
language. Macnaghten stated that juries would be sympathetic 
to the doctor who operated under the belief that to continue 
the pregnancy would be to risk rendering the woman a ‘physical 
or mental wreck’.37 ‘If pregnancy is likely to make the woman a 
physical or mental wreck’ the judge concluded, ‘the jury is enti-
tled to take the view that a doctor, who in the circumstances 
and led by his belief operates, is operating for the purpose 
of preserving the life of the mother’.38 Hailed by psychiatrist 
Montague Joyston-Bechal as a ‘typical example of the matu-
rity of the English legal system’, the term ‘mental wreck’ was 
described as ‘picturesque rather than precise’, the ambiguity of 
which ‘creates both its strength and its weakness’.39 Joyston-
Bechal continued,
‘wreck’ is sufficiently emotive a term to discourage any who might be 
tempted to co-operate in ridding a woman of the distress appropriate 
to a temporary embarrassment. Also, ‘wreck’, being ill defined, can 
embrace any number of individual variations of psychiatric sequelae 
to pregnancy. Many regard this ambiguity as a weakness, offering 
such little guidance that they are restrained from recommending ter-
mination unless the wreck is total—presumably derelict and unfloat-
able. Most of us take the view that the law can be interpreted more 
widely and that although we terminate to prevent the development 
of a serious and prolonged psychiatric disorder, this might not neces-
sarily be permanent, or incapacitating.40
The term thus allowed for some clinical autonomy. Nonethe-
less, the phrase was a cause of consternation and was criticised 
for being ‘scarcely scientific’.41
The ambiguity of the Bourne judgement, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, created discrepancies how the phrase was interpreted in 
practice.42 Some doctors interpreted the Bourne judgement 
to mean that the potential for damaged mental health justi-
fied termination, while others sought evidence that it was a 
certainty.43 In 1964, R F Tredgold observed that psychiatrists 
had to come to two main judgements: first, would ‘the patient’s 
health break down irretrievably’ and second, ‘will she commit 
suicide, if pregnancy goes on?’.44 This standard, as Keown has 
shown, was not ubiquitous. Under the ‘Bourne’ judgement, 
psychiatrists had some leeway in implicating mental health in 
abortion judgements; the 1967 legislation provided explicit 
formal grounds for this. Psychiatrist James Arkle reflected in 
1957 that Macnaghten’s phrase ‘mental wreck’ was important 
for psychiatrists in that it ‘makes it justifiable for him to recom-
mend termination if he honestly believes that continuation of a 
pregnancy will make a woman a mental wreck. Lesser degrees of 
emotional upset are not enough, nor are social disturbances of 
any magnitude nor eugenic forebodings of any kind’.45 Against 
this limited interpretation of Macnaghten’s statement, the 1967 
Act can be seen as a significant extension and expansion of the 
concept of risk in abortion cases.
rIsIng expeCTATIons And CulTures of rIsk ConTrol
First, though, it is necessary to set out why the concept of ‘risk’ 
attained such influence in post-war Britain. The period following 
the Second World War marked the recognition of an expansive 
definition of well-being, codified by the WHO in the late-1940s, 
when it defined health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being’.46 This broad definition of health allowed 
doctors greater scope for medical intervention. Greater inter-
ventionalism was enabled by a culture of rising expectations 
of health in Britain after the creation of the National Health 
Service (NHS), for under the NHS illnesses could be managed. 
Moreover, the increased availability of contraception in the 
decades after the Second World War rendered childbearing and 
its attendant strains increasingly avoidable. The 1949 report of 
the Royal Commission on Population noted that women were no 
longer willing to tolerate excessive childbearing, instead prefer-
ring their ‘independent status’ and ‘wider interests’.47 Indeed, 
Dugald Baird commented in 1966 that ‘instead of fatalistically 
accepting a succession of unplanned pregnancies, the mother 
is now determined to have the number of children she wants 
and feels capable of caring for’.48 In 1971, it was suggested by 
Norman Todd, a consultant psychiatrist, that raised expectations 
might explain the increased demand for therapeutic abortion; 
‘it may be that women are less able or willing to adapt to, or 
even tolerate, the burden of unwanted pregnancy as they were in 
the past’.49 For Bourne, defendant in the precedent-setting 1938 
case, the relationship between unlimited childbearing and illness 
was clear: the strain of ‘repeated and unwanted pregnancies’ 
would render women ‘tired, lifeless and worn out’, and ‘fear, 
depression and fatigue’, would ‘exact its price in the form of 
physical symptoms’.50 By the mid-1960s, women were increas-
ingly able to implement family planning measures. The intro-
duction of the contraceptive pill on the NHS in 1961 signified 
a broader acknowledgement that family planning contributed to 
individual, familial and national well-being.
It was argued in 1966 that the women of the 1960s were ‘less 
timid, less furtive, more determined and more practical’ and 
were capable of demanding an abortion from a doctor under 
‘reasonable conditions’.51 Baroness Summerskill contended in 
1965 that abortion was ‘a matter in which the voice of women 
should be the deciding factor’, for it was their ‘human rights’ 
under consideration and the views of the Church should not be 
decisive for ‘it is not for celibate men to decide the fate of these 
women’.52 Unwanted motherhood, here, was not framed as a 
fate to be endured. Sociologist John Peel claimed that ‘a respon-
sible attitude towards parenthood and a desire to protect the 
interests of an existing family will not be lightly sacrificed for 
an unplanned pregnancy’, a trend he identified as part of ‘the 
revolution of rising expectations’.53 The relationship between 
family planning and women’s expectations of their life cycle 
was clear: ‘when a woman has resumed work outside the home, 
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after careful planning of her family, an unwanted pregnancy 
can be a disastrous blow’.54 In 1973, Raymond Illsley noted the 
connections between contraception and women’s assertiveness 
around abortion: ‘the more emphasis we place on family plan-
ning the more likely it is that patients themselves will claim the 
right to decide. The delicate interchange of hints and clues in 
the doctor–patient encounter… has already changed and will 
continue to change towards a more direct exchange of request 
and opinion’.55
As Alex Mold has argued, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a 
shift towards a greater recognition of the agency of the patient.56 
The culture of paternalism within which the patient submitted 
unquestioningly to the will and expertise of the physician was 
beginning to change: instead, the patient as a consumer was 
emerging.57 In the context of the 20th-century renegotiation 
of the doctor–patient relationship, the anxieties expressed by 
doctors regarding the accessibility of the legal framework high-
lighted the patient’s particular role as an active agent in seeking 
the abortion procedure. Drew Halfmann suggests that doctors 
objected to legal clauses that would ‘create categories of patients 
who were eligible by law for abortions, thus removing the neces-
sity of doctors’ diagnoses and turning doctors into ‘mere techni-
cians’; in Britain, he shows, this concern was principally about 
patient infringement on professional discretion.58
Abortion reform was seen to put clinical autonomy at risk 
through its creation of the knowledgeable and entitled female 
patient. As pointed out by S J Macintyre, from the Centre of Social 
Studies at the University of Aberdeen, the medical profession 
maintained ‘mystique’ and authority through the relative opacity 
and inaccessibility of the diagnostic and treatment criteria for 
most medical practices.59 In the case of abortion, however, legal 
reform rendered the criteria for treatment visible.60 Correspond-
ence to the British Medical Journal suggested that gynaecologists 
were worried that they would ‘have women and their relatives 
“breathing down their necks” if the Bill provides a codified list 
of indications for termination’.61 Here the risk was that the law 
might facilitate ‘abortion on demand’, fundamentally reworking 
the power dynamic of the doctor–patient relationship.62
MedICAl CulTures, professIonAl bodIes And rIsk
There was a growing sense of optimism about the potential for 
interventions in mental health in mid-20th century Britain: the 
numbers of in-patient beds in psychiatric hospitals declined 
from 1954, new drugs became available and the 1962 Hospital 
Plan proposed the integration of psychiatric units into general 
hospitals.63 Mary Boyle has argued that the 1959 Mental Health 
Act had important implications for the place of mental health 
in abortion reform through its recognition of mental illness 
as equivalent to physical illness and through its affirmation of 
doctors as impartial, authoritative adjudicators.64 By the 1960s, 
Boyle contends, definitions of ‘psychological harm’ had become 
elastic enough to accommodate the arguments for abortion 
reform.65 This occurred against a backdrop of the development 
of the welfare state; a model of national organising that has been 
framed by David Garland as a ‘risk management state’.66 Indeed, 
risk has been argued to have been critical to the rationale of 
the British welfare state, constituting the state’s ‘response to 
the problem of handling the risks encountered in a typical life 
course’.67 The risk of ill health was targeted by the establish-
ment of the NHS. It was within this broader transformation to 
the landscape of mental health that abortion reform occurred 
and within which medical bodies representing different medical 
specialisms sought to intervene.
From the early 1960s, medical organisations accepted that 
abortion reform was likely; what form this might take and how 
it would affect medical autonomy became primary concerns.68 
As Keown has argued, professional autonomy was a major 
concern of the organisations that represented the specialisms 
of the medical profession.69 Michael Thomson has suggested 
that abortion was a boundary issue for the medical profession 
in the 20th century.70 Certainly in the period preceding the 1967 
Act, medical bodies published a flurry of memoranda on abor-
tion reform. The contribution of the British Medical Associa-
tion (BMA) was particularly important.71 The BMA’s July 1966 
report emphasised practitioner discretion, the exclusive right of 
the medical practitioner to undertake abortions and opposed 
non-medical grounds for termination.72 In so doing, it asserted 
its members as the sole legitimate arbitrators and necessitated 
the medicalisation of women’s options. The BMA suggested 
that a termination might be lawful if two medical practitioners 
agreed, and it granted that the likelihood of foetal deformity 
could be taken into account.73
The Royal Medico-Psychological Association published a 
memorandum on abortion reform in July 1966. It approved 
the inclusion of social, medical and psychiatric indications in 
the termination decision, as they contributed to the ‘promo-
tion of health and the prevention of disease’, and suggested that 
in ‘addition to traditionally accepted medical and psychiatric 
criteria, all social circumstances should be taken into account’.74 
The Association advised that the patient ‘must be viewed in the 
total context of the woman’s individual, family, social and life 
experience’.75 The report argued that in the case of a ‘severe 
chronic mental illness…there is a prima facie case for therapeutic 
abortion’.76 While it reflected that this should not automatically 
lead to termination, it commented that the children of ‘feckless 
and irresponsible’ parents, incapable of fulfilling their parental 
duties, were prone to being ‘unhappy and mentally disordered 
and are particularly prone to behave in an antisocial manner’; 
thus, ‘the likelihood of serious parental inadequacy of this sort 
does…constitute grounds for termination of pregnancy’.77
The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(RCOG) published the most conservative of the professional 
association reports.78 It suggested that the majority of gynaecol-
ogists opposed immediate reform of the abortion law. Moreover, 
it proclaimed change unnecessary: ‘we are unaware of any case in 
which a gynaecologist has refused to terminate pregnancy, when 
he considered it to be indicated on medical grounds, for fear 
of legal consequences’.79 The College suggested that psychiatric 
symptoms could be ‘exaggerated’.80 Furthermore, it was argued 
that suicide following a refused abortion was uncommon.81 Risk 
of suicide, it is worth noting, may have been underestimated due 
to coroners’ reluctance to record it as cause of death, instead 
recording it as due to the less stigmatised death by misadventure, 
accident or under an open verdict.82 It argued to intervene was 
to put women at greater risk of mental disorder:
There are few women, no matter how desperate they may be to be 
find themselves with an unwanted pregnancy, who do not have re-
grets at losing it. This fundamental reaction, governed by maternal 
instinct, is mollified if the woman realizes that abortion was essential 
to her life and health but if the indication for the termination of 
pregnancy was flimsy and fleeting she may suffer from a sense of guilt 
for the rest of her life.83
The BMA and the RCOG published a joint report on abor-
tion reform in late 1966.84 The report was concerned that 
the bill introduced by Liberal MP David Steel contained too 
wide a social clause (stipulating that therapeutic abortion was 
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permissible in the case of rape, or if the pregnancy posed a signif-
icant risk to the woman’s capacity to mother), creating scope for 
‘abortion on demand’.85 ‘An excessive demand for abortion on 
social grounds’, the bodies noted, ‘would be unacceptable to the 
medical profession’.86 Instead, they suggested that the patient’s 
‘total environment’, ‘actual or reasonably foreseeable’ could be 
considered.87 In lieu of social language, medical organisations 
proposed that the social and psychological environment be 
drawn into the medical framework.
The implications of this expansion of medical discretion were 
discussed earlier in the 1960s, during the consideration of Lord 
Silkin’s proposed abortion reform bill, which preceded Steel’s 
private members bill.88 Lord Silkin’s 1965 speech in the House 
of Lords invoked the uncertainty of doctors in interpreting the 
law as it stood, as well as the ‘public expense’ of treating illegally 
attempted abortions.89 Silkin emphasised that his Bill would facil-
itate doctor discretion and noted that it enabled responsiveness 
to the ‘health of a patient or the social conditions which make 
her unsuitable to assume the legal or moral responsibility of 
parenthood’.90 Responding to Lord Silkin’s proposal of a second 
reading of his Bill, Viscount Dilhorne agreed with the need for 
legislation, and reflected professional medical bodies’ concerns 
that taking the social implications of an unwanted pregnancy 
into account might require a ‘remarkable degree of prescience 
on the part of medical practitioners’ and cautioned that some 
of the provisions of the Bill, such as allowing abortion for preg-
nancies brought about by rape, might ask doctors to ‘undertake 
what they are not really well fitted to perform’.91 Instead, he 
claimed that ‘surely the test in such cases should be whether the 
continuation of a pregnancy is likely to cause serious injury to 
the mental or physical health of the woman or girl’.92 Although 
he supported reform, he cautioned that terminating a pregnancy 
was a serious choice and framed this within the discourse of risk: 
‘I understand that it is wrong to suppose that the operation, even 
if performed in the early days of pregnancy, and when properly 
conducted, is entirely without risk. There is a risk of trauma, 
physical or mental, which may be serious and prolonged, and 
possibly irreversible; and there may be physical results as well’.93 
The Lord Bishop of Southwark reiterated anxieties that the 
social frame did not accord with the qualifications of medical 
professionals, suggesting that it ‘places too heavy a responsibility 
on the medical practitioner’.94 Beyond this, he asked ‘Are we to 
assume that a degree in medicine gives to the holder of it such 
insights into sociological problems that he is competent to deter-
mine by himself, and without consulting anybody else, what are 
suitable and unsuitable social conditions?’95 The respondents 
to Silkin’s Bill asserted the importance of the medical profes-
sion, with Lord Stonham, the joint parliamentary undersecretary 
of state in the Home Office, making this connection explicit: 
‘We must also attach special weight to the views of the medical 
profession. The proposed changes would impose considerable 
responsibilities on doctors, and we have to be sure that they are 
willing and able to carry them’.96
rIsk, sTress And The soCIoMedICAl envIronMenT
In 1971, David Steel M P wrote of the increased recognition 
of the interdependence of ‘social conditions’ and ‘medical 
considerations’.97 He even suggested that the drafting of the Act 
‘encouraged the concept of sociomedical care’.98 Sociomedical 
care contributed to the medicalisation of areas of life previ-
ously not under the auspices of the medical profession.99 One 
psychiatrist declared in 1966 that his profession was as inter-
ested in social context as social reformers due to the ‘inevitable 
influence of environment on mental health’.100 Writing 1 year 
before the passage of the 1967 Act, Anderson E W claimed that 
‘no psychiatrist needs to be reminded of the importance of the 
social factor both in the aetiology and the prognosis of all mental 
illness regardless of its form. The social factor in effect weighs as 
heavily as the medical’.101 Here the social and the medical were 
considered distinct but complementary. The patient was socially 
situated within the clinical setting, and the physician was posi-
tioned to consider how social and environmental factors might 
impinge on the health of the individual patient.
That the Abortion Act drew the social into medical view 
under the guise of psychiatric risk was not uncontroversial. It 
was thought after the passage of the Act that the indications for 
termination had led to ‘widespread misconception’ that abortion 
could be secured on social grounds.102 One psychiatrist lamented 
that ‘psychiatric diagnosis is reputed to be soft, flexible and 
accommodating enough to be used to achieve whatever goals the 
diagnostician wishes to reach’.103 This demonstrated that ‘the 
label of threat to the mental health of the subject may be regarded 
as a convenient method of achieving abortion on demand under 
a different guise’.104 This was reiterated by an international 
report written by Raymond Illsley and Marion H Hall in the 
late 1970s, which noted ‘psychiatry became the Trojan horse by 
which liberal abortion was introduced into societies with restric-
tive laws but humane ideologies’.105 In Britain, the Trojan horse 
took the guise of the acknowledgement of the traffic between 
social and medical indications by the risk of psychiatric disorder. 
Illsley had noted this in 1973, observing that ‘Psychiatry had 
already proved, in many spheres, a discipline amenable to the 
pressure of changing social values and customs… But could one 
justify termination on psychiatric grounds for a young woman 
whose past history showed no signs of behavioural or person-
ality disorder, and whose distress arose from the consequences 
of thoughtless and hedonistic acts or their stigmatisation by 
society?’. The answer to this was, he suggested, often in the 
affirmative: ‘the consequences were real enough for the patient 
whose welfare the physician accepted as part of his professional 
responsibility’.106 In 1966, Sir Dugald Baird, formerly Regius 
Professor of Midwifery at the University of Aberdeen, claimed 
that it was indefensible to exclude social factors, for this took 
little heed of ‘the effect of customs, tradition, education, the new 
status of women in society and a host of other factors which 
influence health, happiness and efficiency’.107
The concept of stress was one way that the social and the 
medical were bridged to articulate the risks posed by an unwanted 
pregnancy. As David Cantor and Edmund Ramsden have argued, 
by the mid-20th century stress had become one of the dominant 
lexicons through which anxieties over the nature of modernity 
could be expressed.108 The vocabulary of stress was deployed to 
account for an increasing number of psychological and physical 
reactions to life events, reframing the relationship between the 
external world, the body and the mind.109 The psychological 
gaze encroached further into public and private life as psycho-
logical experts encouraged the public to consider their personal 
experiences within the framework of stress.110 Mark Jackson 
has argued that the amelioration of stress ‘promised new thera-
peutic options’ for a society in the midst of cultural change.111 
The stress discourse mapped onto social anxieties, and engaged 
increasingly with the psychological and the social, rather than the 
biological or hormonal.112 Baird noted that his study, carried out 
in Scotland, revealed that between the years of 1961 and 1963, 
the percentage of pregnancies terminated on surgical or medical 
grounds remained stable, but the percentage carried out for 
psychiatric reasons more than doubled.113 This, he explained, was 
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due to the emergence of a ‘very important new group’, identi-
fied as ‘suffering from emotional and physical stress aggravated by 
adverse emotional and living conditions’.114 Rhodri Hayward has 
argued that stress was a ‘productive concept’, providing ‘a kind of 
conceptual glue which allowed individual failings…to be joined 
to broader transformations in society or the environment’.115 The 
concept of stress traversed socio-economic groups, allowing work-
ing-class and middle-class women to engage with the same need 
for abortion. Stress thus provided a legitimising terminology for 
the association between social causes of medical consequences.116 
Some were provoked to ask if the pregnancy was a ‘final straw’ 
that ‘simply puts too much stress’ on the patient.117
An interest in the psychosocial aspects of abortion was reflected 
in the medical interest in adverse reactions to the procedure. 
In 1976, Raymond Illsley, Director of the Medical Research 
Council Medical Sociology Unit, and Marion Hall, Consultant 
in Obstetrics and Gynaecology at the Aberdeen Teaching Hospi-
tals, published an extensive review of the psychosocial aspects of 
abortion in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization.118 In 
it, they acknowledged not only that attitudes to abortion were 
culturally contingent, but that women’s emotional and psychi-
atric responses to abortion were shaped by the societies from 
which they emerged. Indeed, they identified guilt over abortion 
as ‘traditionally induced as part of a traditional system of social 
control’ and argued that ‘in such circumstances, it is superfluous 
to ask whether patients will experience guilt—it is axiomatic 
that they will’.119 Roger Tredgold had similarly claimed in 1966 
that the psychiatric aftermath of abortion was ‘to some extent 
affected by the attitude of the ward and especially of the gynae-
cologist and nurse’, for they might, from time to time, ‘vent their 
feelings on a patient whose story makes little appeal to their 
sympathy’.120
Although there was significant debate about the emotional 
sequelae, studies found that adverse psychiatric reactions to 
termination were rare.121 Peter Diggory, a gynaecologist, claimed 
that abortion ‘relieves the strain under which the woman was 
breaking, and if followed by adequate contraceptive advice…
there may be little further need for psychiatric help’.122 Indeed, 
abortion might maintain a woman as a ‘useful member of the 
community’, which supported his view that abortion might 
sometimes be ‘merely a part of the psychiatric treatment’.123 This 
consideration of the potentially prophylactic effects of termina-
tion reflected a broader turn towards the significance of moth-
ering in post-war Britain.
MoTherIng And rIsk
Tolerance of ostensibly social reasons for abortion reform, 
although under the guise of psychiatric risk, was facilitated by 
post-war ideas of maternal responsibility for child psychoso-
cial development. However, grounds for this were laid earlier 
in the 20th century; during the 1930s advocates of safe abor-
tion had suggested that it would support the family unit and 
safeguard maternal health.124 By the post-war period, medical 
experts argued that a married woman seeking to limit family 
size would see ‘a striking improvement’ in her own health, that 
of her family, marital relations, and ‘a more congenial home 
atmosphere’, and indeed, the ‘removal of the constant threat of 
pregnancy allows the woman to be a better wife and mother’.125 
Within this framework, abortion was not an emancipatory tool 
but a means of supporting the psychosocial role of the family. 
Effective family planning measures, including access to abortion, 
would reinforce rather than undermine the family and social 
aspirations.
The influence of John Bowlby’s attachment theory affirmed 
beliefs that the unwanted child faced and posed psychosocial 
challenges.126 It was wondered prior to reform what implication 
liberalisation would have for rates of ‘juvenile delinquency, alco-
holism, mental deficiency, suicides, homicides, arrests’.127 This 
reveals some of the enduring influence of the eugenicist language 
that was deployed in social debates earlier in the century.128 
There was some concern in the House of Lords that the social 
scope of abortion reform might facilitate ‘a certain amount of 
pseudo-eugenics’.129 Baroness Wootton of Abinger noted that 
‘there is a real risk that, if we allow a social clause, we shall be 
allowing the medical profession to make judgments on consid-
erations which are not medical but social…I am anxious that we 
should be absolutely clear of pseudo-eugenics and regard this 
Bill entirely from the point of view of the pregnant woman, her 
welfare and the welfare of the child she may be about to bear’.130
Nonetheless, it was considered by some doctors to be a social 
good to prevent the ‘spread’ of undesirable behaviours by facili-
tating safe abortion. In 1966, it was claimed by a senior doctor in 
psychological medicine that, ‘now that it is almost axiomatic that 
delinquency is associated with bad homes, it seems illogical to 
insist that an unwanted child shall be brought into the world, not 
only into bad physical circumstances but with a parent who will 
not love it’.131 In 1965, one member of the House of Lords said 
that access to medical abortion would prevent child rearing from 
threatening to ‘wear down the personality of the mother until 
she becomes just a drudge’; a childcare environment that would 
risk creating a ‘malformed or mentally defective child who has 
no real prospect of ever becoming a real human personality’.132 
Ben Clements and Clive D Field have examined opinion polls 
and sample surveys to review trends in public attitudes towards 
abortion since the 1967 Act. They show that according to a 
1964 National Opinion Polls (NOP) study, 49% of respondents 
rejected abortion arising from an inability to cope with any more 
children, with just 44% of respondents in favour. By 1967, these 
opinions had shifted: two NOP surveys found that 65% accepted 
abortion in these circumstances.133 It is worth noting that there 
was stronger consensus around the acceptability of abortion in 
situations in which women’s health was endangered. As Clem-
ents and Field note, in 1966, a Gallup poll found that 79% of 
respondents accepted abortion in such situations, a percentage 
that rose to 86 in 1967.134 In 1980, a MORI study found that 
91% of respondents approved of access to abortion when the 
woman’s life was endangered.135 Interestingly, the British Social 
Attitudes survey used the language of endangering—the phrasing 
of the question was ‘The woman's health is seriously endangered 
by the pregnancy’—signalling the ways that the legal language of 
risk had elided with endangerment in public discourse.136
The family’s psychological significance to child mental health 
provided a legitimising frame for abortion reform. Madeleine 
Simms of the Abortion Law Reform Association suggested that 
personality development theories endorsed women’s right to 
make decisions over ending a pregnancy.137 Simms noted that 
‘if a woman deeply resents the birth of an unwanted child or 
is incapable of mothering satisfactorily too many children, then 
the consequences in terms of mental health for that child and 
the rest of her family are grave’; indeed, Simms warned, ‘she 
may be laying the foundation of psychiatric illness in the next 
generation’.138 In Lord Silkin’s speech to the House of Lords, he 
noted the broad coalition of support for the principles underpin-
ning his 1965 Bill for abortion reform, including the ‘National 
Council of Women, the Women’s Co-Operative Guild and 
other women’s organisations… the Magistrates Association and 
the Eugenics Society’.139 The interests of groups engaged with 
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women’s social position and those concerned with apparently 
undesirable social behaviours met under the auspices of abor-
tion reform. The post-war emphasis on the significance of ‘good 
enough mothering’ ran alongside an anxiety over the social 
effects of the poor family environment.
rIsk And The InvesTIgATIve MedICAl professIonAl
As Sheldon has observed, however, abortion reform was not 
wholly liberalising; instead, she contends, ‘women seeking 
termination were decriminalised in order to be pathologised’.140 
Gendered constructions of the female patient retained signifi-
cant sway in debates over abortion reform in the early 1960s. 
Sheldon has pointed to images of femininity that were drawn 
on in the debates: women as minors, as victims, and as mothers, 
and as irresponsible and untrustworthy.141 The construction of 
the untrustworthy female patient, however, had implications 
for the medical professional and their role in judging psychi-
atric risk.
The possibility of deception by female patients preoccupied 
some doctors. ‘How is the doctor to know that the patient…is 
not lying about the alleged misfortune which makes or will make 
the bearing of a child intolerable?’, one asked in the BMJ.142 
Women were accused of telling ‘fictions’ including ‘heart-rending 
stories of brutal husbands or landlords or rape by mental defec-
tives, even of risk of hereditary transmission of disease’ in order 
to secure an abortion.143 Here the female patient was not only 
configured as untrustworthy, but liable to use her knowledge of 
the legal grounds for abortion to her advantage. This, too, was 
associated with risk: risk requires the truth to be apparent, so 
probabilities can be evaluated and threats accounted for. The 
woman who wanted something—namely an abortion—could 
obscure the true metrics of risk by misleading a doctor. In 1965, 
a member of the House of Lords cautioned that pressure for 
abortion reform was not coming from the medical profession, 
and that that there was a concern that ‘doctors will be inundated 
with ladies whose contraceptives have not worked and who 
threatened to have nervous breakdowns unless doctor termi-
nates the pregnancy.144
One correspondent to the BMJ suggested that nursing staff 
and mental welfare officers might be drawn on to make ‘suitable 
inquiries’.145 Within this rubric, patient authenticity was under 
investigation, expanding the responsibilities of the medical 
professional. Others were concerned that pregnant women were 
too volatile to make informed decisions; some correspondence 
to medical journals supported the idea that it was unkind to give 
women sole responsibility over abortion decisions, as pregnancy 
rendered women ‘emotional’ and their judgement ‘unsound’.146 
One doctor reflected that women tended to ‘improvise’ their 
attitudes to abortion ‘only when already in a state of confu-
sion and distress’.147 Others advised that women were liable to 
change their mind: ‘how many politicians have any first-hand 
experience of the often surprising as well as gratifying manner in 
which many women later become reconciled to an “unwanted” 
child and thank their medical attendant for refusing to consider 
abortion?’148 The debate over abortion thus revealed tensions 
over patient power in an era of rising expectations of health. 
There were clear anxieties that female patients, and their fami-
lies, might seek to persuade doctors of their poor psycholog-
ical health through deceptive means. That the informed patient 
might seek to avoid the hardships imposed by an unwanted preg-
nancy through utilising the tools of the medical profession was 
considered to have the potential to transform the doctor–patient 
dynamic. It suggested a new role for the physician in the social 
landscape as an arbitrator of risk but also required a renegotia-
tion of power in the consulting room.
ConClusIon
This article has argued that abortion reform in the late 1960s 
supported a broader understanding of the interaction between 
the social and the medical domains in the medical imagination 
and that metrics of risk were critical to this. I suggested that 
raised expectations of health, well-being and the responsibili-
ties of the family facilitated greater medical intervention into 
women’s reproductive lives. It was also enabled by the devel-
opment of the NHS and the broader welfare state. Psychiatric 
risk emerged from abortion legislation as an expansive category 
through which women could access medical terminations for 
reasons informed by their social situation. In the 1970s, Irving 
Zola noted that medicine was encroaching into the social sphere 
and that in issues like abortion moral issues were displaced by 
a debate that focused on ‘the degree of sickness attached to 
the phenomenon in question or the extent of the health risk 
involved’.149 The question of extent of risk, as we have seen, 
preoccupied the medical profession in the years after the Bourne 
decision, leading to the 1967 Abortion Act. More broadly, as 
scholars have highlighted, the rise of the concept of risk has not 
been limited to abortion but has more generally come to play an 
increasingly significant role in parents’ lives.150
We have seen that those supporting and challenging the 
passage of abortion legislation in the 1960s invoked the views 
of medical bodies. This was not a straightforward assertion of 
the primacy of their expertise, however: abortion reform also 
facilitated a discussion about the boundaries of medical deci-
sion-making and required a negotiation of the concept of risk. In 
one way, at least, the risks posed by unwanted pregnancies were 
successfully addressed: within a decade of reform rates of emer-
gency admission due to incomplete miscarriage and abortion had 
declined by two-thirds, indicating that the reform had signifi-
cantly improved women’s access to safe family limitation.151 
Beyond this, abortion reform had provoked a rearticulation of 
medical professionals’ roles at the intersections of the domestic, 
social and medical spheres. More recently, marking the 50 year 
anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act, scholars have interrogated 
the extent of the authority that the Act granted to the medical 
profession, arguing that discussions with doctors who provide 
abortions highlight the importance they ascribe to women’s own 
authority and opinion in making this reproductive decision; 
moreover, as Lee, Sheldon and Macvarish show, ‘those doctors 
most involved in providing abortions place moral value on this 
work’.152 The attribution of authority to women is reflected 
in broader public support for women’s ‘right to choose’.153 As 
highlighted earlier in the article, demands are increasingly being 
made for the decriminalisation of abortion and for further liber-
alisation. These calls are grounded in a conviction that the regu-
lation of abortion should be brought into line with other medical 
procedures but also deploy the discourse of safety. Clare Murphy 
of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service has argued that the 
current requirement for two doctors’ authorisation causes delays 
and has noted that ‘Abortion procedures today are safe and 
straightforward and do not need to be performed by doctors. 
However, the law currently denies nurses and midwives a larger 
role in the provision of care’.154 Thus, safety, antonymic to risk, 
continues to play a role in abortion debates and to feature in 
discussions about which groups of medical professionals play a 
role in abortion services. More broadly, the regulation of abor-
tion in Britain reflects ‘the poor alignment between the ageing 
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statutory framework and contemporary clinical understandings 
of best practice in abortion services’, Sally Sheldon has recently 
argued.155 As we can see, then, the relationship between risk 
and abortion, established in earlier conversations around legal 
reform, has contemporary resonance.
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